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PREAMBLE 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University and deals with the institution of arbitration in the area of Greek public law 
and the most significant legal issues arising therefrom and relating to the arbitrability 
of administrative disputes, especially within the framework of administrative contracts 
and development acts, the advantages and disadvantages of the arbitral resolution of 
administrative disputes, the compatibility of the institution with the Greek 
Constitution, the extent of the review that the State Courts may exercise over the 
arbitral awards and some propositions on behalf of the author of the thesis for the 
further development and improvement of the institution in question. Notwithstanding 
the fact that this thesis does not entertain pretensions to completeness with respect 
to the analysis of public law arbitration, which could be the subject of a monograph, it 
touches the major aspects and answers to the most critical questions thereof. 
The Greek bibliography on the matter being rather short, a considerable part of the 
dissertation was based upon the analysis of the case law of the Greek Supreme Courts, 
especially the Council of State, and the book Arbitration and Administrative Disputes of 
the famous legal scholar Professor Theodoros Fortsakis. In order to enable a better 
understanding and an easier literature research on behalf of the english-speaking 
readers, the whole Greek bibliography has been translated into English except for the 
ambiguous terms which have been merely transcribed in Latin characters. 
At this juncture, just like Homer invokes the Muse in the preamble of his epos with the 
aim of drawing poetic inspiration, I consider it appropriate to make mention of Asst. 
Professor Komninos Komnios who helped me carry out the arduous task of deciding 
upon the subject of the dissertation and acted as the kick-starter for the drafting of my 
thesis. 
Keywords: Arbitration; Administrative disputes; Public law; Constitutionality 
Dimitrios I. Sideris 
27th December 2018  
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INTRODUCTION 
A major question that comes up as far as arbitration is concerned and has caused a lot 
of debate in theory relates to its applicability to public law disputes. In the past it has 
been stated that there is no such possibility1. The relative arguments were connected 
to the particular nature of administrative disputes and to the difficulty of some 
scholars to accept their arbitral resolution2. 
On the other side of the coin, the particular attention that the arbitration of 
administrative disputes has drawn should not overestimate the potential specific 
features of this category of disputes against the private ones, since the underlying 
difference regards mostly technical issues, i.e. issues of constitutionality, whereas the 
nature of arbitration itself does not change accordingly3.  
Furthermore, according to the Greek Constitution, which is the fundamental law of our 
legal order, there is no provision for the judicial monopoly of administrative courts 
over the resolution of administrative disputes, at least the substantive ones4. For this 
reason, the subsumption of administrative disputes under arbitration has already been 
expressly recognized by law5. The so called annulment claims are excluded from the 
above rule because they explicitly belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Greek 
Council of State6, since no arbitral tribunal is vested with the legal power to annul an 
administrative act or omission. It is worth highlighting that even the ordinary 
administrative courts, namely the Administrative Court of First Instance and the 
Administrative Court of Appeal, have no jurisdiction to hear annulment claims unless 
the legislator expressly assigns this responsibility, making use of the constitutional 
exception of art. 95(3) CoG7. Regarding the designation of an administrative dispute as 
of substance or as of annulment, a differentiation which directly affects the relevant 
competence of arbitral tribunals, it is generally stated that every administrative 
                                                          
1 S. Kousoulis, Interpretation of Arbitration, pub. Sakkoulas, 2004, p. 5, citing G. Oikonomopoulos’ 
remarks on the drawing of Code of Civil Procedure 1957. 
2 V. Skouris, Administrative Procedural Law, pub. Sakkoulas, 1991, p. 195. 
3 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, pub. P.N. Sakkoulas, 1998, p. 32. 
4 S. Kousoulis, Interpretation of Arbitration, p. 6. 
5 Art. 871A(5); second subparagraph CCP. 
6 Art. 95(1,3) CoG. 
7 E. Spiliotopoulos, Textbook of Administrative Law, Volume II, pub. Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2011, p. 72. 
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dispute constitutes in principle an annulment claim, whilst the legislator can 
exceptionally designate certain categories of disputes as substantive ones8, the 
exception being in practice more frequent than the general rule. 
A distinction that further affects the legal treatment of the arbitrated public law 
disputes has to do with their affiliation with the so called private property of the 
State9 , since the underpinning rules are different with regard to the genuine 
administrative disputes in which the State enjoys the Sovereign’s privileges. 
                                                          
8 P. Dagtoglou, Administrative Procedural Law, pub. Sakkoulas, 2014, p. 165. 
9 Usually in these cases the State is referred to as Fiscus, by contrast to Imperium. 
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CHAPTER 1 - SCOPE AND INDICATIVE CASES OF PUBLIC LAW ARBITRATION 
1.1 Legislative framework 
Trying to decipher the legislative framework in which the public law arbitration is 
conducted we have to determine the applicable rules of the existing legislation. To 
begin with, it remains debatable in theory whether and to what extent do the 
provisions of art. 867 et seq. of the Greek CCP apply, mutatis mutandis, in the field of 
public law arbitration in a way that satisfies the necessity for legislative regulation of 
the institution examined. Assuming that the provisions of the CCP are -to a certain 
extent- applied by analogy, we draw the conclusion that they are subsidiary to any 
specific provisions for public law arbitration10. However, this is not always the case 
since any specific provisions for public arbitration overrule the CCP provisions, thereby 
rendering inappropriate their application on that certain occasion11. The divergence in 
the applicable procedural law described above renders the categorization of the public 
law arbitration according to its statutory basis necessary, because it is extremely 
difficult to set general rules regarding the applicability of the CCP or other specific 
provisions at a time. What is sure is that an arbitration governed by public law could 
not be based upon the principle of the contractual freedom emanating from art. 361 
CC12, on the grounds that no civil servant or public body is vested with the power to 
dispose rights of the Sovereign State, e.g. the waiving of administrative coercion that is 
needed in order to enter an arbitration agreement with the private sector. 
1.2 Arbitration of disputes arising from public contracts under private law 
The analysis shall first deal with the arbitration of disputes attached to the private 
property of the State and of public persons governed by public law. This category of 
disputes can be freely arbitrated by relying on art. 867 CCP, since their nature is 
                                                          
10 This principle of subsidiarity can be made clear through the reference of the laws regulating the 
hearing of administrative disputes to the Code of Civil Procedure, e.g. the Presidential Decree for the 
Council of State 18/1989 which in art. 40 reads: “As to the remainder and specifically with regard to the 
notifications, the grounds for the recusal of Judges and staff of the Secretariat and the procedure of the 
challenge, the conduct of the hearing, the order of the audience of the Court and the potential measures 
of inquiry, the provisions of CCP regulating the procedure of civil trials before the Supreme Court of 
Areios Pagos are by analogy applied”. 
11 Lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
12 P. Dagtoglou, Administrative Procedural Law, p. 23, a contrario argument. 
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private, provided in addition that the provisions of art. 49 ILCCP are fulfilled13. In 
particular, the written opinion of the State Legal Council in plenary session and a 
consequent joint decision on behalf of the Finance Minister and the respective 
competent Minister is necessary for the validity of the conclusion of an arbitration 
agreement14. Another differentiation with regard to the general application of art. 867 
CCP concerns the appointment of the arbitrators on behalf of the State and its public 
persons and the extended in their favor deadlines15. The scope of this regulatory 
framework usually involves disputes arising from public property leasing and cases in 
which the State claims damages against individuals that have damaged state vehicles16. 
It deserves pinpointing that any dispute initiated by the State against an individual, 
meaning that the claim is not directed against the State but against a private person, 
even though arising from a public contract, is considered private, hence it is regulated 
by the framework analyzed above17. 
The derogation from the provisions of art. 49 ILCCP could be justified when the dispute 
in question arises from an international pubic contract. In this case the constrictions of 
art. 49 ILCCP, being of domestic public policy, are not applicable18. This view has been 
further confirmed by the case law of Areios Pagos, which has ruled that the Greek 
State is not prohibited from agreeing to an arbitration clause without prior observance 
of art. 49 ILCCP when the underlying public contract has an international character, i.e. 
place of arbitration is agreed a third state or governing law is agreed that of a third 
state19. 
1.3 Arbitration of administrative disputes 
Proceeding to the analysis of the arbitration of public law disputes under the strict 
sense, it is useful to examine, first, the provision for the arbitration clause/agreement 
and, second, how this clause/agreement functions in administrative law. At first, it is 
noted that there is no express provision for the arbitration of administrative disputes, 
                                                          
13 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 152. 
14 Art. 49(1); subparagraph 1 ILCCP. 
15 Art. 49(1); subparagraph 2, art. 49(2) ILCCP. 
16 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 156. 
17 Idem, p. 155 
18 Art. 8(1,2) of Decree-Law 736/1970 regarding State Legal Council issues. 
19 AP 986/1986. 
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unlike the regime analyzed beforehand in relation with the private disputes of the 
State and its legal persons. Thus, the arbitration of stricto sensu public law disputes, 
namely administrative ones, is legally based upon specific legislative prescription, for 
instance in the ordinary law, in regulatory administrative acts issued after legislative 
delegation, in individual administrative acts issued pursuant to the regulatory ones, or 
in administrative contracts in which the State or the public legal person enjoys 
authoritative clauses20.It is a common phenomenon for the legislator to prescribe 
arbitration clauses in administrative contracts of major importance in order to render 
them appealing to the counterparty21. Notwithstanding it is equally common that 
these clauses be included in unilateral administrative acts, known as severable 
administrative acts, which are preparatory for the conclusion of the public contract or 
even in ministerial decrees concerning investments or capital imports22. 
Regarding the function of the arbitration clause in administrative contracts, there can 
be either compulsory or potential arbitration with the general practice being in favor 
of the latter23. The Act No 4412/2016, which is currently in force and regulates public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, opts for the 
potential arbitration after relevant opinion of the competent technical council and for 
matters in relation to the execution, interpretation or validity of the Contract24. 
Moreover and in derogation from the provisions regulating the lato sensu public law 
arbitrations 25 , the appointment of arbitrators, the applicable procedural and 
substantive rules, the place of arbitration, the remuneration of arbitrators, the 
language of arbitration and other relative matters shall be regulated in the Contract 
itself after the opinion of the competent technical council26. The law here goes further 
so as to preclude the analogous application of other legislative instruments by 
prescribing even the specific characteristics that the arbitral award under its regime 
should have. In particular, it reads that the arbitral award must include full, specific 
and substantiated statement of reasons, whilst it is final and irrevocable and not 
                                                          
20 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 160. 
21 For the benefits of arbitration in public contracts see Chapter 2. 
22 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 161. 
23 Idem, p. 169. 
24 Art. 176(1) of Act 4412/2016. 
25 Probably refers to art. 867 CCP in conjunction with art. 49 ILCCP. 
26 Art. 176(2) of Act  4412/2016. 
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subject to any ordinary or extraordinary appeal with the exception of the invalidity 
action against the arbitral award pursuant to art. 897 until 900 CCP27. Furthermore, the 
arbitral award constitutes an instrument permitting enforcement without any need for 
approval on behalf of the state courts, whereas the disputing parties are obliged to 
immediate compliance28. When it comes to the carrying out of the arbitration, the law 
reads that it must abide by the ‘Rules of Transparency in Treaty based Investor – State 
Arbitration’ of UNCITRAL, which take precedence over the arbitration rules applicable 
according to the previous paragraph29. Last but not least, a repository authority is 
founded by virtue of a joint ministerial decree of the Ministers of Infrastructure and 
Justice respectively, which shall be responsible for the maintenance, access to and 
publication of the information relevant to the Contract30. 
Nevertheless, in order for the above provisions to be applicable, it is crucial that the 
contract be indeed administrative, meaning that at least one contracting party is the 
legal person of the State, a local authority or a legal person governed by public law. 
Otherwise the contract shall not be administrative but private and the rules applied 
shall be different. In this juncture, it should be pointed out that the Greek case law has 
adopted accordingly the so called organic criterion instead of the functional one31. 
Relevant is the judgment No 10/1987 SSC which has ruled that when the contract 
awarder is a legal person governed by private law, even if it belongs to the State or 
services a public cause, the contract concluded is not considered administrative, 
thereby rendering any disputes arising therefrom private, too. The major consequence 
of this observation is the application of the aforementioned legislative framework for 
the arbitration of private disputes arising between the public legal person and 
individuals. 
Given the tardiness of the State due to the complexity of the rules regulating its 
function and the consequent lack of flexibility, it is common knowledge that the 
construction of big-scale public works for the sake of the public interest is entrusted to 
                                                          
27 Art. 176(3) of Act  4412/2016. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Art. 176(4) of Act  4412/2016. 
30 Art. 176(5) of Act  4412/2016. 
31 S. Flogaitis, The Administrative Contract, pub. Sakkoulas, 1991, p. 196 et seq. 
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ad hoc private entities, which -although founded by the State- are governed by private 
law. Furthermore, in cases in which the budget of a public construction is too 
burdensome for the State or a public organ, it is usually preferable that a private 
investor assume the responsibility of carrying it out on his own expense, vested 
simultaneously with the right to exploit it for a specific period of time, usually thirty 
years, in order to amortize the expenditure and generate a reasonable profit. An 
arbitration clause is almost always included in the contract because this is a means to 
render it more appealing to the concessionaire and even to achieve a reduced price32. 
Prominent examples of this over time consistent tactic constitute the following 
investment and development laws: a) Act No 1956/1991 concerning the construction 
of the natural gas pipeline, b) Act No 2338/1995 concerning the construction of the 
international airport in Spata, Athens, c) Act No 2395/1996 concerning the 
construction of the bridge uniting Rio with Antirio, d) Act No 2445/1996 concerning 
the construction of the Elefsina-Stavrou-Spata Airport freeway and the western ring-
road at Avenue Imittou, all of which entail an arbitration clause33. 
1.4 Other forms of alternative dispute resolution in public contracts 
It is worth highlighting that in public works contracts, in which the full option for 
arbitral resolution of potential disputes is not a priori agreed, there is at least a clause 
for an arbitral expert’s report or a mediation clause. The Act No 1955/1991 for the 
construction of the Athens underground railway and the Act No 2261/1994 for the link 
between Preveza and Aktion constitute important examples thereof because they 
provide for the pursuit of an amicable solution between the contracting parties before 
they approach the state courts34. In case that this amicable solution fails, there is also 
the possibility for an arbitral expertise which shall verify the merits of the case without 
culminating to a definitive decision though35. From all the above it is made evident 
how significant for the counterparties of the State and of the other public bodies in 
contracts of great financial value the extrajudicial resolution of disputes is, since they 
seem to make their best efforts to avoid proceedings before the state courts, possibly 
                                                          
32 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 184. 
33 Idem, pp. 184-191 
34 Idem, pp. 191-193 
35 Idem, p. 158 
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being afraid of both privileged treatment in favor of the State and disadvantageous 
delays. Actually, it is extremely rare for public contracts, especially those designated as 
investment or development contracts and signed mostly by foreign entities, not to 
include an arbitration clause for the resolution of the potential disputes arising in the 
future or at least the provision for exhaustive utilization of ADR techniques before 
seeking refuge to litigation. 
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CHAPTER 2 - MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PUBLIC LAW ARBITRATION 
2.1 Advantages of public law arbitration 
The advantages and the disadvantages of public law arbitration in concreto are more 
or less the same with those of private law arbitration since the kernel of the institution 
remains unchanged. 
To begin with, the public law arbitration as an institution forms part of the wider 
concept of alternative resolution of public law disputes. A classic argument in favor of 
alternative dispute resolution is its procedural expediency in comparison to the 
administrative court proceedings, whose inordinate delay verges sometimes on the 
denial of justice. Therefore, the arbitration emerges as a supportive institution of the 
administrative justice, implementing a more effective operation of the judiciary by 
relieving a part of its burden with the ultimate aim to ameliorate the Rule of Law36. 
Another major argument in favor of public law arbitration is the satisfaction of the 
request for more participatory public administration with a view to modernizing its 
structure and function. In this light the mitigation of the traditional unilateralism of 
public administration is considered an important step towards the consolidation of a 
civil service system more receptive of citizens’ intent, thus more compatible with the 
principle of the protection of individuals37. The list of advantages of public law 
arbitration is further enriched with arguments regarding the simplicity and swiftness of 
the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal in comparison to the formal and 
complicated court proceedings which cause considerable delays and often higher 
costs38. What is more, the confidentiality principle that underpins the arbitral 
proceedings allures contracting parties with significant reputation in the marketplace 
because it reassures that sensitive financial data and other classified company 
information will not be divulged to the public39. On the other hand, the principle of the 
public conduct of court proceedings40 and of the pronouncement of the judgment41 
                                                          
36 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 29. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 Ibidem. 
39 A. Kaissis, Reversal of arbitral awards; Doctrinal foundation of the grounds for the reversal relating to 
the arbitration agreement and the arbitral tribunal, pub. Sakkoulas, 1989, p. 32 
40 Art. 93(2) CoG. 
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that goes through the Greek judicial system renders it impossible for a business entity 
to avoid negative publicity as a result of a trial for breach of contractual obligations. 
The specialized knowledge on technical issues that the appointed arbitrators usually 
have constitutes also a powerful motive for the option in favor of arbitration since a lot 
of disputes arising from technical contracts are difficult to resolve by a common judge 
without familiarization with the corresponding jargon or technical expertise. The 
arbitrators’ familiarization with each of these strictly technical issues is considered very 
helpful and usually renders any need for expert reports redundant42. Finally, the 
individual counterparty of the State tends to feel a greater degree of security towards 
the arbitral tribunal than towards the state court because it perceives the latter as an 
apparatus of the State, therefore as more State-friendly and less keen on the private 
party’s interests, whilst extrajudicial resolution of disputes might additionally 
contribute -due to mostly psychological factors- to a compromise between the parties 
that would be an even more profitable solution43. 
2.2 Disadvantages of public law arbitration 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is often alleged that the use of alternative dispute 
resolution might lead to certain pitfalls. The advantages themselves of arbitration, as 
briefly analyzed above, may be seen in a reverse manner as disadvantages. In 
particular, it could be stated that the arbitral proceedings are not ab initio faster than 
court proceedings, since phenomena of tardiness might affect arbitral tribunals in the 
same way they affect state courts, especially in cases in which the exact time for the 
maximum duration of arbitration is not agreed beforehand between the parties or in 
cases in which a party seeks purposely to delay the issuance of the arbitral award 
because of self-interest. 
Furthermore and as far as the impartiality of the decision-making body is concerned, it 
could be reversely argued that an arbitral tribunal does not bear ipso facto more 
elaborate guaranties of impartiality compared to an administrative court. Besides, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
41 Art. 93(3); subparagraph 1 CoG. 
42 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 30. 
43 Ibidem. 
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there is no constitutional provision for personal and functional independence44 in 
respect to arbitrators; hence the legal guarantees are ex prima facie less45. Neither is 
the administrative judge more affiliated with the state authorities and the state 
interests because of his special duty to examine the legitimacy of the activities of the 
public administration. On the contrary, the reason behind the constitutional provision 
for distinct administrative justice instead of a single jurisdiction system, like in the 
United Kingdom, lies in the initial inspiration of the Greek legislature from the French 
model of administrative organization and control system -tracing back to the 
Napoleonic era- that considered necessary the foundation of a distinct jurisdiction with 
the responsibility to control the respect of the rule of law principle on behalf of the 
public organs. This jurisdiction seemed to be more independent towards the authority 
of the public administration, so it served better the social need for protection against 
the State arbitrariness. It is obvious that the formal guarantees of impartiality the 
arbitral tribunals are vested with pale in comparison if examined in parallel with the 
corresponding constitutional and historical guarantees of the administrative judiciary. 
Nevertheless, it remains a matter of debate as to whether the investors are influenced 
by the above arguments since experience has proven that they are characterized by an 
inherent mistrust towards administrative judges. 
The discussion on pros and cons of public law arbitration has been also preoccupied by 
dogmatic legal arguments concerning the so called purity of law46; in other words to 
what extent could an institution with a fundamentally private law nature be applicable 
in the domain of public law without jeopardizing the consistency of the legal doctrine. 
However, this argument is weak in its basis itself because in fact there is no so pure a 
doctrine but an osmosis of legal rules which serve unequivocally the needs of the 
human coexistence and change accordingly over time as the human and, therefore, 
legal needs change, too47. In this view, it would be preferable to understand the legal 
institutions as an instrument for the resolution of potential disputes instead of a 
                                                          
44 Art. 87(1,2) CoG establishes the enhanced institutional position of the judiciary in the Greek legal 
order, thereby rendering it fully independent against any political power or other state authorities. 
45 A. Kaissis, Reversal of arbitral awards; Doctrinal foundation of the grounds for the reversal relating to 
the arbitration agreement and the arbitral tribunal, pp. 40-41 
46 Drawing inspiration from Hans Kelsen’s theory on the Purity of Law. 
47 K. Komnios, lectures at IHU, LLM 2017-2018. 
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preexisting rigid ultimate goal that becomes itself the ground for the creation of 
formalistic disputes. 
Moreover, the fact that the arbitration, when applied, results in binding arbitral 
awards which are not amenable to appeal and, therefore, incapable of being 
challenged -at least as far as the factual part, the so called merits, of the case is 
concerned- before a superior judicial body constitutes a rational argument that 
especially in the area of public law the arbitration is considered a deficient institution. 
On this premise, it is additionally stated that the absence of more levels of jurisdiction 
in conjunction with the fact that the arbitral tribunal is able to render an award based 
upon more flexible legal grounds in comparison to a state court results in the 
arbitration of administrative disputes being considered more prone to legal flaws, 
hence, less compatible with the principle requiring the protection of the public 
interest. 
From the perspective of the private individual, a major drawback of public law 
arbitration compared to administrative litigation refers to the means that the private 
individual has to achieve the provisional suspension of the force of the administrative 
act which relates to the arbitrated dispute. Whereas the applicant is under certain 
conditions capable of successfully filing a claim for an interim relief, i.e. a suspension 
request, before the administrative court, there is no such provision amongst the 
competences of the arbitral tribunal. This more extensive jurisdictional power of the 
administrative court aside, the contracting parties of the State, the regional authorities 
and the other public bodies still opt for the inclusion of an arbitration clause, especially 
in cases of foreign investors who require international arbitration as a prerequisite for 
the conclusion of the contract. 
A last but not least critical question with regard to arbitration deals with the issue that 
could be summarized in the expression ‘more access to less law’48. Should factors like 
the procedural simplicity and expediency or the presumable lower costs 49  of 
                                                          
48 K. Komnios, lectures at IHU, LLM 2017-2018. 
49 It is a matter of debate as to whether the arbitration is actually less costly than litigation, given the 
high remuneration packages of arbitrators, the expensive operational fees for the institutions that carry 
out the arbitration in cases of institutional arbitration, etc. 
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arbitration override the fundamental interests in effective judicial protection? 
Alternatively, is the quality of the provided justice the same when the decision-making 
body is an arbitral tribunal, namely a private person, no matter how renowned or 
under the auspices of which prestigious institution50 it acts? In order for this question 
to be answered convincingly it is necessary that we draw some arguments from the 
constitutional basis of arbitration and determine the exact article of the Constitution 
that allows its use51. If we accept that the constitutional basis of arbitration is art. 5(1) 
CoG about economic and contractual freedom then the public law arbitration would 
have practically no legal ground since the State bears no right of contractual freedom; 
it is instead bound by the rule of law principle which prescribes that the public 
administration may only proceed to acts for which has competence by law 52. 
Therefore, we should endorse the predominant opinion noting that art. 8(1) CoG is the 
constitutional basis of arbitration. In this respect, since nobody can be deprived from 
his lawful Judge53 without consent, it results a contrario that the consent is the 
requisite that justifies the use of arbitration for the resolution of disputes. In this way, 
the joint consent of the parties bypasses the concerns about the legal policy 
correctness54. 
  
                                                          
50 E.g. ICC. 
51 For more details on constitutional issues see Chapter 3. 
52 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, pp. 58-61. 
53 A Judge vested with all the constitutionally provided prerequisites for his personal and functional 
independency and not a special judicial commission, an ad hoc court or any other judicial scheme that 
would violate the guarantees of the established justice system. 
54 A. Kaissis, Reversal of arbitral awards; Doctrinal foundation of the grounds for the reversal relating to 
the arbitration agreement and the arbitral tribunal, pp. 48-53 
[20] 
 
CHAPTER 3 - CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES AND CRITICAL CASE LAW 
3.1 Traditional jurisprudential approach 
The constitutionality of public law arbitration shall be examined under the prism of the 
five jurisprudential milestones that were of catalytic importance for the evolution of 
the institution as it is nowadays known. 
In the past and for a relatively long period of time the Greek case law had not dealt 
with the matter of the constitutionality of the subsumption of public law disputes 
under arbitration since the affirmative answer of the corresponding question had been 
considered more or less self-evident55. As a result, there evolved the so called ‘classic’ 
jurisprudential approach on behalf of the two Greek Supreme Courts, namely Areios 
Pagos and the Council of State, which accepted tacitly that the arbitration of 
administrative disputes is neither expressly forbidden by the Constitution nor contrary 
to the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of administrative courts over administrative 
disputes under three prerequisites: its voluntary character, its concrete provision by 
the law and that it does not aim to the annulment of an administrative act56. 
Examining more accurately the aforementioned criteria we should draw the following 
observations. First of all, the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a public contract 
should not be mandatory or unilaterally imposed without the other party’s consent; 
the contracting parties should enjoy the right to opt for litigation at any time if they 
wish so. Secondly, the resolution of administrative disputes through arbitration should 
be expressly prescribed by a legal instrument, whether it be a formal law or a 
substantive law, e.g. an administrative act. Finally, it should be made clear that in no 
way is any arbitral tribunal vested with the legal power to annul an administrative act, 
thus it is manifestly inadmissible to bring an annulment claim before it due to lack of 
relevant competence. In other words, only substantial administrative disputes could be 
subsumed under and resolved via arbitration. The majority of the relevant case law on 
behalf of the Council of State during this jurisprudential phase regards disputes from 
the field of taxation and in particular the admissibility of arbitration clauses precluding 
the jurisdiction of the so called tax courts, precursor to the current administrative 
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courts, to which the relative competences have been gradually subjected after the 
entry into force of the Constitution of 197557. It follows from the settled case law of 
the Council of State during this period that these arbitration clauses do not suffer from 
anticonstitutionality, thus the competence of the arbitral tribunal precludes the 
jurisdiction of tax courts. 
3.2 Departure from the ‘classic’ jurisprudence on behalf of the Council of State 
However, already since 1987 the ordinary administrative courts had begun to depart 
from the until then settled jurisprudence of the Council of State by adopting a less 
arbitration-friendly stance, thereby ruling that the common (non-constitutional) 
legislator is prohibited from subsuming tax disputes under arbitration because only the 
state courts are capable of controlling the legality of the imposition of tax burdens in 
the exercise of public authority58. For example, the Administrative Court of Appeal of 
Athens in its judgment 2833/1987 ruled that the arbitration clause in a public contract 
established through and prescribed by formal law and subsuming the potential tax 
disputes arising therefrom contravenes to the Constitution on the grounds that a 
private entity (the arbitral tribunal) could bear no right to resolve taxation issues, a 
competence which belongs to the field of sovereign administration59. Since then and 
due to the quality of the Council of State as court of cassation for the substantial 
disputes (the annulment claims are never subsumed under cassation before the 
Council of State) adjudicated by the ordinary administrative courts the case law started 
to change with a gradual recognition of certain conditions as prerequisites for the 
validity of the subsumption of administrative disputes under arbitration, whereas 
these conditions were not designated as prerequisites during the first jurisprudential 
period before 1988. Exactly this change to the until that time settled case law of the 
Council of State culminated in the total contradiction to the case law of the civil 
supreme court of the country, Areios Pagos, thereby signalizing the necessity for the 
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Special Supreme Court to adjudicate the critical legal matter pursuant to art. 100(1) (e) 
CoG and rule on the issue of the constitutionality thereof60. 
In particular, the Council of State dealt again with the issue of constitutionality of the 
arbitral resolution of administrative disputes arising in the context of investment 
legislation in the case 3441/1988 adjudicated by its Second Chamber, which heard the 
appeal against the 1295/1984 judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of 
Athens with regard to the validity of the arbitral clause of a public contract involving 
capital imports from abroad. According to the Second Chamber the legislator rightfully 
assigned the competence of resolving disputes arising from administrative contracts to 
the arbitral tribunal, thereby ruling that although pursuant to art. 94 (1) CoG does the 
adjudication of administrative disputes belong to the ordinary administrative courts, 
the common legislator is not prohibited from assigning the exclusive competence for 
the resolution of potential disputes related to the interpretation and execution of an 
administrative contract or of an administrative act and in correlation with the meaning 
and the consequences thereof. Therefore, the provisions of the administrative contract 
in question were considered valid and compatible with the Constitution 61 . 
Nonetheless, the Court further ruled that any assignment of competence to the 
arbitral tribunal to annul administrative acts, in this case the tax assessment notice 
issued by the competent tax authorities, infringed the Constitution since the 
corresponding competence has been exclusively reserved on behalf of the Constitution 
for the administrative courts62. Moreover, the Court ruled that the arbitral tribunal is 
not vested with the power to decide neither on the interpretation and application of 
Greek laws nor on matters outside the contract signed and the decree ratifying it63. 
The aforementioned case was finally brought before the plenary session of the Council 
of State due to its having been considered as of major interest. The judgment 
3131/1989 of the plenary session of the Court, issued after the referral of the case on 
behalf of the chamber, signalized the change in the until that time settled case law of 
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the supreme administrative court of Greece. In particular, the Court ruled that the 
provisions of the decree and the contract in question, which prescribed the arbitral 
resolution, were compatible with the Constitution only because the article 112 of the 
Constitution of 1952, whose superior status relative to ordinary laws was maintained 
pursuant to art. 107 (1) of the current constitutional text64, provided for the issuance 
of a one-off law for the protection of foreign investment capital65. The ratio behind this 
provision is the stimulation of foreign investors to import capital in Greece since they 
enjoy a special regime of tax treatment and an enhanced level of legal certainty. Thus, 
amongst the motives of the constitutional legislator, the option for the arbitral 
resolution of potential disputes with regard to the import and investment of foreign 
capital has been included66. However, according to the Council of State, solely this 
specific constitutional provision, which enables the issuance of a one-off ordinary law 
with a higher normative rule, renders the possibility of the arbitral resolution of the 
corresponding potential disputes falling under the area of the administrative law 
compatible with the Constitution, otherwise only the administrative courts would be 
competent for the resolution of any conflict 67 . The judgment of the supreme 
administrative court of Greece goes further on dealing with the extent of the power of 
review that the administrative court might exert over the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal68. The Council of State ruled that on condition that the arbitral award is 
produced before the materially and territorially competent administrative court, the 
latter may decide upon the matter whether the dispute resolved fell indeed under the 
competence of the arbitral tribunal or not69. In other words, it is stated that the 
competence of the arbitral tribunal is limited to the diagnosis of issues arising between 
the contracting parties defined in the decree in respect with the interpretation and the 
overriding of certain legal gaps in the content of the Legislative Decree ratifying the 
contract70, hence it does not entail the resolution of any kind of dispute arising from 
and because of the execution of the investment contract and the interpretation of the 
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Greek legislation even if the investment is directly concerned therefrom71. However, 
the responsibility of the administrative court does not extend to the review of the 
merits of the case resolved by the arbitral tribunal in case the latter has been declared 
competent since the competence provided by the Legislative to it is characterized as 
exclusive72. In fact, the administrative court might control the competence of the 
arbitral tribunal over the hearing of a concrete legal or factual matter relevant to the 
investment contract but in no way could the first enter in the examination of the 
merits of the case for which the latter has had exclusive competence. Therefore, it has 
been made evident that both the public administration and the administrative courts 
are bound by the arbitral award with regard to issues resolved by the latter when they 
examine petitions or legal remedies of the same parties in a subsequent phase. 
The aforementioned case law constitutes the first step of the Council of State towards 
the solidification of the principle of the total prohibition of arbitration in the field of 
administrative disputes pursuant to the articles 93 (1), 94 (1,3) and 95 (1,3) of the 
Constitution, according to which the administrative justice is strictly restricted to the 
administrative courts in a way that even the common legislator does not bear the 
competence to regulate differently73. Moreover, it is alleged that the special nature 
that the Constitution ascribes to administrative disputes excludes the possibility of 
them being subsumed under arbitration because they presuppose the existence of an 
administrative act or the omission of the public administration in the context of 
exercising official authority, whilst the constitutional legislator has expressly declared 
that no one is entitled to control the legality of an administrative act or an 
administrative omission apart from the administrative judge74. The sole exception to 
the above rule is reserved for the so called one-off higher-ranking ordinary laws issued 
pursuant to article 107 CoG in relation to the protection of foreign capital imports75. 
Taking all the above factors into account, it seems irrational that although the one-off 
higher-ranking ordinary laws may allow the application of arbitration for 
administrative disputes the Council of State interpreted the spirit of a series of articles 
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of the Constitution in a way that forbids this sort of arbitrations because, if we should 
accept that the intent and purpose of the Constitution was to exclude arbitration as a 
means for the resolution of administrative disputes, it would be more consistent to 
accept that the one-off laws also point in the same direction, namely against the 
possibility for arbitral resolution of administrative disputes, since they form part of the 
same constitutional order76. In addition, it looks like that the higher status of these 
one-off laws in comparison to the other ordinary laws aims at the avoidance of the 
constitutional revision of the privileged treatment in favor of the State or its bodies 
pursuant to articles 93-95 CoG, which were endorsed by the aforementioned case 
law77. 
3.3 Persistence of Areios Pagos in the traditional approach 
At the other end of the spectrum, the supreme civil court of Greece, Areios Pagos, did 
not alter its settled case law, maintaining its consistent arbitration-friendly position. In 
a relevant case brought before the First Chamber of Areios Pagos the constitutionality 
of the arbitration of administrative disputes was discussed. The Court ruled that 
pursuant to articles 112 of the Constitution of 1952 and 107 (1) of the Constitution of 
1975, whose ratio has been the protection of foreign capital with the further intent to 
facilitate the implementation of foreign investments and boost the financial growth of 
the country, every dispute arising between the contracting parties from the 
implementation of public contracts signed within the context of the aforementioned 
protective investment legislation and referring to the execution or interpretation of 
the conditions thereof or the extent of the rights and obligations emanating therefrom 
should be exclusively resolved via arbitration, by way of derogation from the 
provisions concerning the arbitrations of the State78. In particular, the Court ruled that 
the provision of the investment contract in question, referring to new tax or tariff legal 
instruments which established a more favorable regime for the appellant but which 
are not applicable in case they contravene to the current contract, should be 
interpreted in a way that enables the arbitral resolution not only of private law 
disputes arising therefrom pursuant to articles 867 CCP and 94 (3) CoG but also 
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substantial administrative disputes pursuant to article 94 (1) CoG, hence including a 
taxation dispute79. In other words, the contested provision pursued the arbitral 
resolution of potential disputes so as to avoid the jurisdiction of state courts, either 
civil or administrative, because the possibility of their interference constitutes an 
investment disincentive given the delays caused by the strict procedural requirements 
and formalities80. For this reason, the judgment culminated in declaring the arbitration 
of the substantial administrative dispute which arose from the execution of the 
investment contract in question as valid and compatible with art. 94 (1) CoG since, 
according to Areios Pagos, the reference to the jurisdiction of administrative courts 
aims plainly to define the separation between private and substantial administrative 
disputes adjudicated by civil and administrative courts respectively and not to forbid 
the subsumption of both private and substantial administrative disputes under the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals given that the institution of arbitration was already 
known in the foreign and domestic legal order at the time, thus it would be expressly 
stated81. Finally, the judgment 981/1992 of the First Chamber AP, taking into 
consideration the conflict with the case law of the Council of State on the exact same 
critical legal issue referred the case to the Supreme Special Court. 
3.4 Resolution of the question raised by the Special Supreme Court 
Although the Special Supreme Court had already dealt with the divergence between 
Areios Pagos and the Council of State over the question of the constitutionality of the 
subsumption of administrative disputes under arbitration in its 6/1992 judgment, the 
critical issue had not been properly resolved due to a legal maneuvering of the first 
which attempted a compromise between the judgments of the two Supreme Courts82. 
In particular, the Special Supreme Court ruled that there had been no conflict in the 
case law of the two Supreme Courts because each one had based its legal reasoning on 
a different constitutional basis; on the one hand, the Council of State was seized of a 
dispute over taxation, namely a substantial administrative dispute, and ruled that the 
term of the administrative contract which provided for the arbitral resolution of tax 
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disputes infringed art. 94 (1) CoG establishing the jurisdiction of ordinary 
administrative courts over the substantial administrative disputes, whereas Areios 
Pagos had ruled on the occasion of an annulment claim concerning the legality of the 
administrative acts revoking planning permissions (a dispute that had been subsumed 
under arbitration pursuant to the terms of the underlying contract) that there had 
been no contravention to art. 95 (1) (a) CoG which lays down the jurisdiction of the 
Council of State with regard to the annulment of the enforceable administrative acts 
due to misuse of power or violation of the law83. Therefore, the Supreme Special Court 
avoided taking a clear side by ruling that each one of the supreme courts had founded 
the judgment upon a different constitutional provision, thereby denying the existence 
of any kind of conflict. 
For this reason, the need for the Special Supreme Court to be seized of the matter 
afresh was made evident after the issuance of the 981/1992 AP judgment84 which was 
perceived as being in conflict with the last judgment 1793/1991 CoS. This occasion led 
to the issuance of the judgment-milestone 24/1993 SSC according to which the 
Constitution does not forbid the legislative provision for the possibility that the Public 
Administration and the taxable person agree for the subsumption of a tax dispute 
under arbitration. In particular, the Special Supreme Court more or less endorsed the 
solution that Areios Pagos had given in favor of arbitration by claiming that the real 
meaning of art. 94 (1) CoG did not prohibit the common legislator from providing for 
an arbitral resolution of tax disputes arising from the execution of an investment 
contract between the Public Administration and its counterparty since the Constitution 
in article 78 (4) does not prohibit the Public Administration from laying down any 
exemptions from taxation85. Thus, it is obvious that the Special Supreme Court 
elaborates here an argument a majore ad minus, ruling that since the common 
legislator is capable of enforcing tax exemptions he is also capable of providing for the 
arbitral resolution of tax claims in certain cases. Despite the correctness of the 
conclusion, the reasoning of the Special Supreme Court is weak because the reference 
to art. 94 (1) CoG is in this case inadequate without additional reference to art. 8 (1) 
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CoG86. What is more, art. 98 (4) CoG does not prohibit the common legislator from 
laying down tax exemptions but it renders him exclusively responsible for this duty 
through the issuance of the corresponding ordinary laws, whilst it is clear that he 
cannot authorize the Public Administration with the power to decide thereupon87. For 
this reason, neither positive nor negative arguments could be drawn from the 
reasoning of the Special Supreme Court in judgment 24/1993 concerning the 
constitutionality of the arbitral resolution of administrative disputes, whereas it is 
more appropriate to claim that it would be compatible with the Constitution to 
subsume ad hoc under arbitration any tax dispute that shall arise from a defined legal 
relationship with the joint agreement between the Public Administration and the 
taxable person88. 
The opinion of the minority in the 24/1993 SSC could be summarized in pointing that 
the article 94 (1) CoG should be interpreted under the prism of art. 1 (1,2) CoG so as to 
acquire the meaning that the common legislator is prohibited from subsuming 
substantial administrative disputes, hence tax disputes as well, under ‘private courts’ 
like the arbitral tribunals because the review of the legality of the administrative acts 
issued in the exercise of State authority has been exclusively assigned to the 
competent State Courts89. Therefore, according to the minority, the State authority 
characterizes both the unilateral administrative acts and the administrative contracts, 
whilst being an expression of the principle of popular sovereignty emanating from art. 
1 (2,3) CoG which is the foundation of the democratic state and not a right subject to 
expropriation90. Since the arbitral tribunals can be seized solely of disputes regarding 
private rights subject to expropriation it is absolutely inappropriate to vest them with 
the responsibility to review the legality of the administrative course of action through 
a special regime of ‘capitulations’ in the delivering of justice in the area of 
administrative disputes, namely disputes arising in the occasion of the exercise of State 
authority, because this would be equivalent to the refutation of the principle of 
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popular sovereignty91. Especially when it comes to disputes in the area of taxation, the 
constitutional provisions for the effective imposition and allocation of tax burdens in a 
strict and unimpeachable way precludes the assignment of decisive competence 
concerning the interpretation and application of taxation laws to private persons by 
the common legislator notwithstanding the fact that the latter is by virtue of art. 78 (4) 
CoG capable of deciding upon tax exemptions under certain circumstances 92 . 
Therefore, the term of the contested contract which provided for the arbitral 
resolution of administrative (tax) disputes infringed not only art. 94 (1) but also 1 (2,3) 
CoG93. 
3.5 The jurisprudence of the Council of State after the judgment 24/1993 
The impact of the judgment 24/1993 SSC on the case law of the Council of State has 
been apparent ever since; the latter has returned to its initial stance towards the 
matter by adopting an arbitration-friendly perspective that accepted in principle the 
constitutionality of the subsumption of administrative disputes under arbitration, an 
evolution that is clearly reflected by the judgments of its Second Chamber 3635/1994 
and 198-214/1995. 
For instance, in its judgment 198/1995 CoS the Second Chamber, which was seized of a 
tax dispute through the procedure of cassation, ruled that art. 28 of the 27-8-1960 
contract between the Greek State and the founders of “Aluminum of Greece AEVE”, 
ratified under the Legislative Decree No 4110/1953, about an investment for which a 
capital import from abroad had taken place with the approval of the Royal Decree 
584/1960, issued itself by virtue of the Legislative Decree 2687/1953, did not 
contravene to art. 94 (1) CoG as long as the administrative court is capable of 
reviewing the competence of the arbitral tribunal, thereby ignoring the arbitral award 
on the grounds of lack of competence, however, in case the latter is declared 
competent, the court cannot proceed to the review of the factual and legal correctness 
of the award whose determination is here binding94. Furthermore, the binding 
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character of the arbitral award is further extended to the constitutionality questions 
raised within the framework of the interpretation of the terms of the underlying 
contract upon which the tribunal has expressly or tacitly decided95, a major novelty in 
the jurisprudence of the supreme administrative court which had never in the past 
accepted the competence of the arbitral tribunal to interpret authentically the law96. 
To make a long story short, the relevant Greek case law commenced with the tacit 
acceptance of the constitutionality of the subsumption of administrative disputes 
under arbitration except for the competence for the annulment claims restricted to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of administrative courts. Then the Council of State changed 
its case law and by going on the exact other side ran contrary to the relevant 
jurisprudence of Areios Pagos and resulted in the resolution of the conflict by the 
Special Supreme Court which endorsed the classic arbitration-friendly stance. This 
development is fervently applauded amongst theorists and practitioners even though 
it would be dogmatically more accurate to endorse the founding of the relevant 
argument on the principle of the lawful judge pursuant to art. 8(1) CoG97. 
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CHAPTER 4 - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDSUNDER PUBLIC LAW 
4.1 Constitutionality of the exclusion of validity review 
There has been a lot of debate as to whether the arbitral awards issued on 
administrative disputes should be subject to judicial review and what the legal nature 
of the petition for their reversal is. The answer to the question above differs 
depending on the view adopted with regard to the categorization of arbitration as an 
institution belonging to the organization of the official justice by virtue of the 
Constitution or as a completely autonomous and alternative solution thereto98. On the 
one hand, it is crucial that the autonomy of arbitration be enhanced in respect to its 
position in parallel with the official system of justice, thereby promoting its 
disengagement from the ex post control of the State Courts99. On the other hand, it is 
also of vital importance that arbitration as an institution abides by certain rules and 
does not exceed certain limits so as to be considered a sufficient and respectable 
means of justice next to the official one; thus, it is necessary that the arbitral award be 
subject to review by the competent State Courts in order for the aforementioned 
prerequisites of good repute to be fulfilled100. 
Especially when it comes to arbitration of administrative disputes, the relation with the 
state jurisdiction is not the same as when an arbitration of private disputes is at stake 
since the prerequisites of the judicial review differ considerably exactly because of the 
nature of the arbitrated dispute. Given that a lot of public contracts, especially in the 
framework of foreign investments, and unilateral administrative acts and legislative 
instruments, e.g. the Legislative Decree 2687/1953, ratifying the aforementioned 
contracts include arbitration clauses providing that the arbitral award shall constitute 
an instrument permitting enforcement without any need for affixing an enforcement 
clause on behalf of the single Judge of the Court of First Instance at the Secretariat of 
which the arbitral award has been submitted pursuant to art. 918 (2) (d) CCP, thereby 
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rendering any sort of review on behalf of the State Courts redundant101, vivid 
controversy concerning the constitutionality of the corresponding clauses has been 
triggered oftentimes. It is to be accepted that the monopoly of the State with regard to 
the enforcement of the decisions of the Judiciary applies when it comes to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, too. After all, it is common ground that only the State 
enjoys the legitimate monopoly of means of violence102 in order to implement the 
decisions of the state organs issued by virtue of their respective competences and, 
consequently, reassure the rule of law. Therefore, the awards rendered by arbitral 
tribunals could not be directly implemented without the intervention of a state organ 
that could vest the award with the power of enforcement103, this state organ being 
here the single Judge of the administrative Court of First Instance104. 
For the question highlighted above both jurisprudence and theory have taken sides 
mostly in favor of the compatibility with the Constitution of the exclusion of judicial 
review of the arbitral awards on certain occasions. In particular, the Court of Areios 
Pagos has verbatim ruled that “the resolution of disputes provided by arbitrators 
possessing guarantees of efficiency and impartiality is established by excluding the 
application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the under any means 
refuge to the State Courts, the possibility of interference of which would inevitably 
generate hesitation with regard to the importation and investment of foreign capital 
due to the delays caused by the necessary compliance with formalities and procedural 
requirements”105. This jurisprudence could be characterized as settled due to its 
constant and stable adoption in most of the decisions rendered by the chambers of the 
supreme civil court, whereas no significant divergent positions in the examined case 
law could be found. Furthermore, according to AP 356/1991106 the exclusion of the 
option for an invalidity action – petition for the reversal of the arbitral award or any 
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other legal remedy before the state courts under the circumstances described above 
infringes neither art. 20 (1) nor art. 8 (1) CoG. 
The dominant view in theory follows more or less the settled case law on the matter, 
thereby affirming the constitutionality of the legislative exclusion of invalidity actions, 
which ratifies the consent of the counterparties107, namely the State or the public body 
and the private natural or legal person. However, there are also opinions of some 
academic legal writers108 that express serious reservations regarding the compatibility 
of such exclusion both with the Constitution and the ECHR109. According to them, the 
right to be heard by a court, based upon art. 20 (1) CoG in conjunction with art. 6 (1) 
ECHR, is not fulfilled but only through the provision of a legal remedy before an official 
court that will review the arbitral award at least for potential violation of procedural 
requirements. They further elaborate their argument by claiming that since the 
Legislative Decree 2687/1953 itself, which is of a higher normative status, does not 
entail any relevant exclusion clause, the exclusion clause included in the contracts and 
the ratifying acts, which are vested with regular normative power, contravenes to the 
constitutional order, whilst the lack of the possibility of review is to the detriment even 
of the investors themselves since they remain defenseless against any violation of the 
terms thereof110. 
4.2 Constitutionally indispensable scope of the judicial review of arbitral awards 
The determination of the requisite substance of the judicial review over the awards 
rendered by arbitral tribunals requires the resolution of the issue concerning the 
relation between the official state justice and the private one, which is the major 
problem in connection with the profound nature of arbitration111. The scope of the 
judicial review of the arbitral awards is reflected in art. 897 CCP which sets out the 
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grounds for the revocation of an arbitral award, thereby outlining the minimum 
standard that the task of review should respect112. 
Pursuant to art. 897 CCP “an arbitral award can be totally or partially reversed only by 
virtue of a court judgment and on the following grounds: 
1. If the arbitration agreement is invalid, 
2. if the arbitral award was issued after the arbitration agreement ceased to apply, 
3. if the arbitrators were appointed in violation of the terms of the arbitration 
agreement or the legal provisions or if the parties had revoked them or if they 
rendered the award in spite of their exemption request having been accepted, 
4. if the arbitrators acted overstepping the powers with which they are vested by the 
arbitration agreement or by the law, 
5. if the provisions of art. 886 (2), 891, 892 CCP were violated, 
6. if the arbitral award is contrary to the public order or morality, 
7. if the arbitral award is incomprehensible or contains contradictory provisions, 
8. if there exist reasons for the reopening of the procedure pursuant to art. 544 CCP”. 
Taking all the above into consideration, we easily draw the conclusion that the judicial 
review of arbitral awards prescribed by the Greek legal order involves, on the one 
hand, the conditions on which the arbitration of a dispute is permitted and, on the 
other hand, the compliance on behalf of the arbitrators with the fundamental 
guarantees that constitute the cornerstone of any form of justice, either official or 
private.  
In particular, the State Court shall examine whether the arbitration clause/agreement 
is valid, hence whether there is indeed a genuine voluntary declaration of intention for 
the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the official justice, whether this arbitration 
clause/agreement has been legislatively approved in order to acquire the necessary 
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normative status and whether the subject of the arbitration clause/agreement is 
capable of settlement by arbitration. However, the judicial review should not be 
limited to the control of the validity of the arbitration clause/agreement, hence merely 
to matters of pure form, but should extend further to the control of the respect to 
considerations of judicial policy, thereby satisfying the need for the realization of the 
rule of law. For this reason, the state court shall review the application of fundamental 
principles as well, e.g. the principle of the equality of arms between the disputing 
parties in proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, the principle of independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators, the principle of audi alteram partem113 etc. 
4.3 Legal nature of the invalidity action and enforcement of the arbitral award 
Regarding the legal nature of the invalidity action, namely the legal remedy leading to 
the judicial review of an arbitral award, the prevailing view is that it does not 
constitute an appeal but rather a procedure for the review of the elements of the 
external legality of the award. Therefore, the legal protection provided via this legal 
remedy is not primary because justice has already been administered primarily by the 
arbitral tribunal114, whereas the state court carries out solely a review over the 
lawfulness of the procedure. In theory, though, legitimate concerns have been raised 
with regard to the need for a means of rectification of the potential irregularities that 
the arbitral award might contain; in other words, the vital question is whether there 
exists any need for the provision of correction of the arbitral award and whether the 
extent of the correctional power of the court should differ depending on the nature of 
the arbitrated dispute as private or administrative. 
With respect to the latter segment of the aforementioned question, it is important 
that the specific character of the administrative disputes be underlined. In particular, 
the outcome of the arbitration in the case of administrative disputes concerns at a 
larger scale the public interest, thereby resulting in the need for intensification of the 
review exercised in comparison with the resolution of private disputes. At the same 
time, nevertheless, the fact that the subsumption of administrative disputes under 
                                                          
113 From the Latin language: “Listen to the other side”, which is interpreted as “let the other side be 
heard as well”. 
114 S. Kousoulis, Constitutional Dimensions of Arbitration, Nomiko Vima 42 (1994), pp. 771-772. 
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arbitration was a scheme devised with the aim to serve the legitimate interests of 
investors, especially from abroad, who wish to circumvent the tardiness of official 
justice -towards which they remain skeptical- constitutes the ground for the 
justification of a less meticulous judicial review of the arbitral award. In this way an 
oxymoron arises; although the arbitral resolution of an administrative dispute would 
justify a stricter review on behalf of the State Courts due to the increased involvement 
of the public interest, the teleological interpretation of the public law arbitration 
culminates in the exact opposite conclusion. 
The last but not least controversial issue is whether the judicial review described above 
should be exercised by the civil or the administrative courts, given that the basic pleas 
of invalidity are outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure whose provisions apply by 
analogy unless they contradict with the relevant provisions of the ratifying legislative 
instrument115. Typical example of the above scheme is art. 898 CCP according to which 
“competent for the adjudication of the invalidity action is the court of appeal within 
whose area of jurisdiction the arbitral award has been issued”. Although this provision 
refers to the competent civil Court of Appeal it is to be upheld as a general principle 
that for the invalidity action especially against arbitral awards resolving administrative 
disputes the competent court is correspondingly the administrative Court of Appeal; 
likewise for any other reference by the Code of Civil Procedure to the competence of 
civil courts applied by analogy for duties relevant with the public law arbitration. 
As a side note it should be reiterated that the dispute is designated as administrative 
on condition that the legal remedy is lodged by the private person against the legal 
person of the State, a local authority or any other public body and never vice versa, no 
matter if it derives from and because of an administrative contract. On the contrary, 
when the proceedings are initiated on behalf of the State or any of its organs against 
the individual the dispute is designated as private because the criteria of the exercise 
of public authority and the clauses of state prerogatives are not fulfilled, hence such 
disputes shall be adjudicated by the competent civil courts116.This view has been also 
upheld by the jurisprudence, the most eminent being the judgment 2324/1991 
                                                          
115 AdmCourtAp of Athens 1449/1994, Dioikitiki Diki 1994, pp. 1380-1381. 
116 Ep. Spiliotopoulos, Textbook of Administrative Law, Volume I, pub. Legal Library, 2011, pp. 197-199. 
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AdmCourtAp of Athens which ruled that when the State does not act unilaterally by 
virtue of its special privileges, e.g. administrative coercion, but opts instead for judicial 
protection by lodging an action for damages against the individual, the respective 
dispute is not administrative in spite of emanating from the administrative contract 
because the subject of the litigation is not the unlawful conduct of a public sector body 
but of a private one. 
It follows from the foregoing that in case of a subsumption of an administrative 
dispute under arbitration two alternatives might exist. On the one hand, when the 
State (or public bodies treated as having such status) brings claims art. 918 CCP applies 
and the arbitral award must be vested with the enforcement clause by the competent 
Judge; in this case the arbitral tribunal is treated as a civil Court and its award is subject 
to the same obligations in order to be enforced117. On the other side of the coin, when 
the private party brings the claims against the State (or its equivalents) then the 
arbitral award is treated as a judgment of an administrative Court so that art. 199 (1) 
CAP applies by analogy118. In this case, in Prof. Fortsakis’ opinion, the competent Judge 
for the attachment of the enforcement clause is the president of the civil court who 
performs an administrative task pursuant to art. 94 (4) CoG which provides for the 
possibility of assigning certain administrative duties to Judges119. 
  
                                                          
117 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 119. 
118 Prof. Fortsakis refers to art. 59 (1) Presidential Decree 341/1978 which has already been 
incorporated in the new Act 2717/1999, namely the Code of Administrative Procedure. 
119 T. Fortsakis, Arbitration and Administrative Disputes, p. 119. 
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SYNOPSIS - CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The arbitration is not a new institution but it has been known for years as an 
alternative justice administered by private persons of good repute, special skills and 
expertise in the area of the resolution of a certain category of disputes at a time, 
including administrative ones, for instance disputes arising from public construction 
works, disputes deriving from the execution of development laws for the attraction of 
foreign investors, disputes concerning the taxation of the ventures etc. In every 
category of disputes examined above it was evident the large scale of the interest at 
stake, either by reference to the amount of capital invested or to the great importance 
of the creation of a trusting atmosphere towards the foreign capital owners with the 
aim to attract international investments to the domestic market, thereby boosting 
economic activity and ameliorating in the long run the national finances and the 
economic indicators. The mistrust towards the State and the public institutions in 
general that characterizes foreign capital owners and constitutes a common 
phenomenon not only in the Greek reality but also in possibly every country of the 
world that acts as a recipient of foreign investment capital has led to the emergence of 
institutions like arbitration, belonging more or less to the sphere of private initiative 
and serving the cause of the avoidance of meddling with the jurisdiction of the State 
because the wide variety of national legal orders across the world and the specific 
particularities in the operation of each one of the state apparatuses would 
considerably hamper the realization of foreign investments; the lack of familiarity of 
the capital owner with the particular legal order would constitute a disincentive since 
phenomena like tardiness, corruption or other factors of uncertainty would discourage 
the progress of the venture. 
Exactly in this environment of lack of confidence towards the diversity of legal systems 
and philosophies the institution of public law arbitration plays the role of the 
guarantor since any potential dispute deriving from the implementation of the 
investment, e.g. the misinterpretation of the contractual terms, the breach of the 
contractual obligations etc, shall be resolved without the interference of the state 
justice whose considerable delays are often seen as a serious obstacle to any large-
scale investment, either international or domestic. Furthermore, the fact that a lot of 
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efforts have been made in order to harmonize the legal framework of arbitration all 
over the globe, for example through the development of common legal standards, like 
the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and their adoption on 
behalf of the majority of the countries that aspire to become hosts of foreign 
investment, encourages even more the interested parties to negotiate and include an 
arbitration clause in the contracts they sign. In other words, the possibility of having an 
option for arbitration when entering a contract with the State or any public body 
equivalent thereto generates confidence and feelings of security that reflects positively 
to the economic indicators, which is the kernel of any reform that the State lately 
attempted in order to improve its competitiveness at the international level. 
For this reason, it is to be strongly advocated that the legislator should assume any 
possible measures to facilitate the inclusion of arbitration clauses in administrative 
contracts and the taking place of effective arbitral proceedings with the least possible 
chances for reversal of the arbitral award on the grounds of misinterpretation of the 
law. In particular, it would be of great benefit to lay down a concrete legal framework 
for the public law arbitration so as to avoid interpretations by analogy of provisions of 
private law arbitration and legal vacuums that lead to inconsistent case law and legal 
uncertainty. 
Furthermore, when it comes to constitutionality issues with regard to public law 
arbitration, we should endorse the view that the right to opt for the arbitral resolution 
of an administrative dispute finds its constitutional basis in art. 8 (1) CoG, whereas art. 
26 (3), 87 (1), 93 (1), 94 (1,3) CoG allocate the competences within the framework of 
the state sovereignty and the authorities which constitute its enunciations (Legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary) pursuant to the principle of separation of functions, thus it 
would not be tenable that the aforementioned constitutional provisions should be 
interpreted as restricting the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and establishing a 
monopoly in favor of State Courts despite the explicit intent and consent of both 
contracting parties. The fundamental principle in dubio pro libertate 120 , which 
underpins our legal order, contributes to the recognition of arbitration as a 
constitutional individual right without contravening to the principle of lawfulness of 
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[40] 
 
the administrative action since in the case of public law arbitration the Administration 
has been legislatively authorized to agree the subsumption of substantive 
administrative disputes under arbitration, thereby rendering any contradictory 
argument with regard to the power of disposal devoid of substantial content. 
Derogation from the above position lays down solely art. 95 (1,3) CoG which expressly 
and outright reserves the competence for the annulment of administrative acts to the 
Council of State and on specific conditions to the Administrative Courts of Appeal by 
precluding any other body, i.e. arbitral tribunals, from the power of annulment of 
administrative acts or omissions. 
Finally, it is crucial that de lege ferenda the fragmented regulatory framework 
concerning public law arbitration becomes more consistent and solid in order to 
overcome obstacles like the controversy as to the proper legal remedy for the review 
of arbitral awards and the jurisdiction of the competent court respectively, whilst it 
would be also advisable that de Constitutione ferenda, in view of the imminent or a 
future constitutional reform, a relevant provision which expressly establishes the 
possibility of arbitral resolution of administrative disputes be laid down so as to 
constitutionally confirm the current arbitration-friendly case law and avoid potential 
informal constitutional changes 121  attributed to the divergent pre-interpretative 
perceptions of each member of the Judiciary. 
  
                                                          
121 Different interpretations of the same constitutional provision, usually vague enough, due to the 
change in circumstances or varying pre-interpretative perceptions of the Judge. 
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